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Case No. 9048 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
--'i-F I L 
JOSEPH H. DUPLER, L, HOWARD 
' ' ' ·, 
' ' ~ •; ' 
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,· ,, 
' ' -~ 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE Of UTAH 
JOSEPilli.DUPLER,L.HCHVARD 
},fARCLS, B. ~1. ROE and DAY I D 
I. ZIXIK, 
Appella-nts, 
MAURICE YATES, 
Respondent. 
\ Case No. 9048 
Pf.J'.l'ITJ{ll\ FOB, nt;Hl!;AJUXG AND BRIEF 
IN SUP.POWl' 'l'HEHEOF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Come now Appellants and respectfully petition this 
honorable Court to vacate the Order of the Court affirm-
ing the judgment and to rcver:>e s.aid judgment or to 
grant a rehearing. 'l'his petition i~ based on the follow-
ing grounds : 
POINT L 
This court erred in holding tlmt a Fnmmary judg-
ment was properly entered in ravor of defendant. 
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2 
POIXT II. 
Thi;.; court erred in holding reliance hy plaintiffs on 
others precluded reliance on defendant. 
POINT III. 
'l'hi::; eomi erred in holding t11at from the termination 
of !he \Vyoming action::< it. rrmst be inferred that plain-
tiff's were fully compensated and their claimR satisl'ied 
thereby. 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS & BLACK 
SA;',fUEL BERNSTEIN 
Counsel for Appellants 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
I hereby ecrtiry that I am one of the attorneys for 
the appellantf', petitioners liL'JTin, and tltat in my opinion 
there is good cause to beliPYe Jhe judgmeut ohjeded to 
is erroneom; and that the case ought to he re--examined 
as pru.\ ed ror in said pdition. 
Daietl this 9th day or June, 1960. 
BRIGHA~:I E. ROBERTS 
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BHll£F I~ f.iL:PPOH'r OF APPELLAXTS' 
PETITIOl\ FOrt HEHEARIXG-
ARG U .\1 I:JX'l' 
POI:--T'l' I. 
THIS COURT ERRED I='< HOLDTNG THAT A SUJI-
)!ARY JUDGMEKT WAS PROPERLY ENTERED IN FAVOR 
OF DEFENDANT. 
We submit. that the holdirlf( in this ease is abwlutely 
contrary to Ja'N and il' this opinion is per6isted in we 
·will have in rtah a hybrid and anomalous .~ummary 
judgment proceeding. 
The one fundamental and controlling principle ap-
plied ir1 all cases until the present. one i6 that all infer-
ences rnu~t be drawn in l"avor of the JXtrty or parties 
against ,,-horn a ~mnmary jud.e;ment is sought . .Jforris 
r. Farnsworth Jlotel, 123 rtah 289. :l9 P. 2d 298; 6 
}[oore's Federal Practice 21:!:), § fif\.13 (3). 
In cases of fraud the rule i~ stated in G Moore's 
Federal Practire :!21:1 § fifl.17 (27) as follows: 
"In ru1inp: on the motion the court rhonkl 
remember that the movant has the burden of 
demonstrating !'lenrly the absence of any genuine 
isme of material f'nd, that the court ~lwuld noi 
draw factual inferences in favor of the moving 
party." 
Under the next two points ·we will demonstrate 
plaintiff~ were denied the benefits of thi~ rule and 
judgment ente1·cd against them in violation thereof and 
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4 
in violation of plaintiffs' right to a plenary trial. Con-
sternatiun follo-ws a realii\ation that all that stands 
bet.w{X'Tl plaintiffR and a plenary trial is an affidavit 
by plaintiff~ that they did too rely on the false state-
ments made by defendant concerning the amounts whieh 
vdcre to be paid for the various interesb purchased. 
'l'hese allegations were made in the pleading,; and there 
is no place in the reeord where defendant under oath, 
or otherv.'ise. categorically denied that allegation or al-
leged that there wa~ rJO reliance hv plaintiffs upon 
defendant. 
In refusing to follow the above fundamental prin-
eiple this Court has made it necessary for counsel to 
file affidavits in support of pleadings even though the 
pleadings tbcrn~clves are not denied or challenged. 
Let us here and now assure tlris Court that had 
counsel felt the nece~sity, an affidaYit would have been 
filed allegiilg reliance. The result is reached in this case 
beeausc ot' !.he failure to file an arridavil to fad~ alrearly 
in the rcrord both by pleading and inference. Plaintiffs 
are denied a trial on the merit;; because of a technicality 
and tl1is Court applies a drastic remedy thereby thwart-
ing such a triaL 
As we read the majority opinion in this ease, if Uris 
Court erred in holding that reliance on others precludes 
reliance on defendant and that tcnnination of the 'iY_I·om-
ing actions n·qnirPs a finding that plaintiffs were fully 
compenmted and their claims sat i:died, then the judg-
ment of the trial court should be reversed and plaintiffs 
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granted a trial of the action which they have never had 
under the rulings of the trial court and the majority 
of this Court. 
POINT II. 
THIS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING RELIANCE BY 
PLAI~TIFFS 0='< OTHERS PRECLUDED RELIANCE ON 
DEFF.~DANT. 
It stand~ uncont.radidcd iu the re~onl defendant 
made the representations a~ alleged in the complaint 
and they were false. It stands uncontradicted plaintiffR 
made the payments alleged. These payments >vere more 
than the cost repre:;;ented, more than wn:-; actually paid 
for the interest~ purchased. 
'l'his Court takes the position that arbnitting this, 
lli'\'L'rthL•ies~, there wa,; 110 reliance on these misrepre-
St'lltatiom because plaintiffs relied on representations 
of others. Of course, this i~ simply a non sequitur. If 
Loth A and B mu.ke miHeprescntations and I te~tify I 
relied on statements made by A it just does not follow 
that I thereby declare I did not rely upon the represen-
tations of B, nor may it be inferred that I did not rely 
on B. Yet ihi~ Court makes that inference even in the 
fare or the rule that all inferences are to be drawn in 
favor or plantil'rs here. That plaintiff:-> did rely on 
derendant'6 representations is proved by the fact they 
paid what defendant represented the cost to be. 
Another situation i~ here presented wl1iel1 obviomly 
has escaped the attention of this Court. The represenla-
tion made by the Aimonettos and Simmons had to do 
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with the productivity of the wells involved. Defendant's 
misreprescntatiom consisted of statements relating to 
how much the particular interest to be obtained by plain-
tiffs and defendant cost or what. defe-ndant had paid 
for plaintiffs. 'l'l1i:; t.\·pe of representation was not one 
of value or productivity of the well but a misrcpresen-
tniion a~ to selling price. For instance B tells A that a 
well is worth $10,000. (_' tells A that the co~t of thl' well 
is $7,500 and a~ a lllattc-r of fact itf; cm;t is $5,000. A pays 
$7500. It would certainly be reasonable to find H1at A 
relied upon both representations. That he relied on one 
would not vreclmle reliance on the other. Rut thi~ Court 
holds no reliance upon the representation as to ('ll~t. 
Take the other situation pre::;ented. B tells A he 
has paid $1,000 for an interest for him. _A::; a m.a.tter of 
faet hP has not. A pay::; the $7,000 to B. No reliance! 
No trial on the meri 1 ~ may be had. 
In the Fir~t Cause of Adion it i~ alleged that de-
Fendant reprPscnted that an undivided one-f"ourth inter-
est would eo~t $60,000.00 and that this 'm~ false. Defend-
ant represented that he had paid $30,000.00 for a one-
fourth undivided interest and that this was false. 
Here is a ~ituati.on where defendant falsely repre-
sented the amount an undivided one-fourth interest eo~t 
and l"nlsely represented what he had paid for one-half 
of an undivided in!Nest ani! defendant then paid $30,000 
for one-half of said undivided one-fourth interest. 
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These representations had nothing to do with the 
repre8entations made by the Aimonettos. These had to 
do with what this interest cost plaint.ifl's and defendant. 
By falsely representing the cost defendant was able to 
get plaintiffs to pay more than what the interest obtained 
actually cost plaintiffs and defendant. 
It. is just inconceivable that there would be no re-
liance upon a represent.at.ion that an undivided one-fourth 
intere~t co::;t $GO,OOO.OO when in fact it did not co~t that 
much yet plaintiff paid $30,000.00 for a om~-half of the 
one-lonrlh interest. Certainly there would be reliance 
on this even if thc:re was reliance upon a representation 
that the well had a value greater than it actually had. 
(Paragraph 3 (b), Second Cause of Aetion, Exhibit D). 
Take the faet lwn:-. Defendant said the 10ost of the 
one-fourth intc1·cst wa~ $60,000.00, it in fact cost $40,-
000.00 and plaintiffs rmid $30,000.00 for one-half thereof. 
How C{tn anyone say or infer that plaintiff,; did not rely 
upon that mi~represPntation 1 If he didn't rely upon it 
why is he paying the $:10,000.00 for one-half of nn interer;t 
which cost. only $40,000.00! 
The Second Cause presents mneh the o:amc situa\ion. 
Plaintiff Dupler and defendant bought a one-fourth in-
terest which defendant represented 1.0 cost $35,000.00 
and he reprer;P:nted he paid $l7,500.00 for his one-half 
whieh he had not paid. l-'laintiff Dupler pays the 
$17,500.00 and defendant getH a one-half int.crc;;t without 
paying. \Vould plaintiff have paid the $17,500.00 for one-
half of a one-fourth when that wa:-> the cost ol the whole 
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onc-fourth1 How can this Court conscientiously say 
that there was no l'eliance on thi~ representation in mak-
ing this payment even though someone else made a m.is-
repre~entation as to productivity which was also relied 
upon1 
In the Third Cause defendant represented to plain-
tiff that he had paid $7,000.00 to purchase a 5% interest 
for plaintiff. 'l'his was fahle. Plaintiff paid defendant 
$7,000.00. Why did he pa.\· the money if he didn't rely 
upon defendant's repreRcntation that he had paid this 
amount'? Can anyone fairly say that plaintiff did not 
rely upon this represe-ntation in making the payment~ 
Can anyone say that if plaintifl' had known tbis money 
had not been p.aid he would still have paid the $7,000.00 
to defendant1 Is not this reliance-f Suppose t(':;timony 
·was introduced that thi~ representation was made, that 
plaintiff paid defendant the $7,000.00 and 1hat the rep-
resentation was false. These allegations are not contra-
dicted. Certaillly this would support, if not require, a 
finding of reliance v.ithout any direct testimony that 
there 'nt~ reliance. Al~;o that someone el~e had misrep-
resented the value of produdivity would not preclude 
or eliminate reliance on the rqH·esentation that the 
money had been paid by defendant for plailltiff. 
In tlK' Fourth Cause defendant reprr~ented that the 
50% interest cost $77,500.00, that he had paid his $15,-
500.00 for hi~ 10% interest. As a mat1er of fact the 
50% cost $62,000.00 and defendant had not paid anything 
for his 10?( interest. Why would plaintil'rs lmve paid 
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the $62,000.00 for 40~-;, if that was the cost of 50% r 
How can this ·Court or anyone else say plaintiffs did not 
rely upon this misrepresentation as to cost regardless 
of other misrepresentations? And mind you, non re-
liance is found as matter of law on a summary judgment 
before issue is joined by answer. K otlting would have 
been added l1y an afl'idavit that plaintiffs did too rely. 
The Fifth Cause i~ a tonsolidation ol' the other 
cause" and hence reliance is established there. 
In all of these cau6es of aetion one J'act absoluiPly 
requires a l'inding of reliance. That is, in every instance 
plaintiffs paid the exact amount defenilant reprer;ented 
the purchase price to be. 
We submit the l'inding fL'1 matter of law or the in-
ference that. there was no reliance is ju~t simply nvt 
justified. 
POINT III. 
THIS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT FROM THE 
TERMINATION OF THE WYOMING ACTIONS IT MUST BE 
Tl\FERRED THAT PLAINTIFFS "WERE FULLY COMPEN-
SATED AND 'l'IlEIR CI,AilifS SATISFIED THEREBY. 
'fhis Court asserts: 
"Thus, from anything that appears in this 
record, it must Lu assumed that the claims fo1· 
damagec; whid1 they now asserl against Yates 
were sat.ic;fied in tho~e "'"'"yoming actions." 
Vle submit this is a violl'ni. as;;umption and is made 
m face of the rule that all ir1fcrences must he drawn 
in favor of the parties opposing a motion for summary 
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judgment. Also, in face of the fact that Yates wa.s 
not a part;.- to those \Vyoming· adiOTIS. 
How come sur_h an assumption ran be made when 
the ver~y bringing of these aetions against Yah·~ 1s an 
assertion to the contrary. 
Also, as dearly appears, the hao:is of the "\Yyoming 
actions and of this cm;e are eniirely different. The 
Wyoming cases were based on a Federal statute and 
misrepresentation as to v.alue, productivity, etc. Here 
defendant misrepresented the adual cost paid for in-
terPst in welk 
Lnder the principles applied to summary judgments 
it is incumbent upon defendant to dto\\" that there was 
satisfaction or compensation paid to plaintirfs. 'rhcre 
1s no such evidence in the record. 'l'his Court has In-
ferred plaintiffs out of court. 
In the cas61:l invlllving the Aimoneltos I he order of 
dismissal wa,; not binding upon plaintiffs so far as 
defendant Yates is roncernefl. He was not a party. We 
can imagine 11 hal would be said if a favorable judgment 
against the Aimonettos had been obtained and we sought 
to bind defendant Yates therewith. 
The rec•urr] here only disclo~es ihat an artion ''"''~ 
pending against Simmons. There is no proof of any 
di~pm;ition of the case and no evidence of a judgment 
in favor of plaintiff. Defendant admits this in his brief 
(pnp:r 43). Disposition or termination of this case was 
not even before the trial court. This Court assumes that 
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there has been satisfaction. The Federal Reporter shows 
a dismissal of an appeal by Simmons. \Vas it incumbant 
upon plaintiffs to make affidavits concerning matters 
not in the recordf \Ve do not believe any rule or law 
foists such a burden on plaintiffs here. 
One of the most astounding thingr; in this case is the 
reliance by this Court, in defeating plaintiffs, upon the 
dismissal of the Sinanom appeal. As appears in 268 ~·. 
2d 217 the dismissal was entcrcd Febmary 2G, 1959. 
·l'he Summary Judgment herein appealed from ·was 
si_gncd and ente-red five monthr; before thiR, to-wit: 
September 10, 195S (88, 89). How can there be any 
justification ror thisf How could plaiTitiffs make a 
counter affidavit concerning tcnnir1a.tion of a case 110t 
yet terminated1 How can this Couli say that an infer-
ence may be made of satisfaction of a claim from ter-
mination ·where the cam;e thereon iR still pendingf 
If defendant claimed the termination of theRe eases 
eornpen::;ated plaintiffR for theit· losses should they not 
assert it by affidavit or otherwise'! How C'ould eour1sel 
for plaintiffs anticipate that this or any other eourt 
would draw an unfavorable infereMc again A plai.nti l'f~ in 
thi~ ;;ummary judgment proceeUing and require an aJfi-
davit against such inference? 
We submit there is no justification either in fact, 
law or jn~tice to infer from the dismissal of a case, the 
pendem·y of a case or t.hc obtaining ol' a favorable judg-
ment, that satiRfaction of all claims has been accom-
plished. Such evidence in the trial of tllis case would 
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not have supported a finding to that effect. Defendant, 
in such affirmative defense, would be required to estab-
lish the ultimate fact of satisfaction or payment. 
We submit that this Court cannot infer satisfaction 
from termination particularly when one ca8e had not beeiJ 
terminated. To require counter affidavits in such a 
a situation would impose an impossible burden on plain-
tiff~. 
CONCLL:SIOX 
\Ve submit that this Court in the particulars above 
set forih has drawn unfavorable inference::< against plain-
tiffs contrary to established law. We submit the ma-
_jori ty opinion revolutionizes <~=ry judgment pro-
ceedings. Without direct denial of reliance plaintiffs 
would l1ave to file an affidavit that they did too rely eve-n 
though they 60 state in their .Amended Complaint (which 
r;hould be taken into consideration under Rule 56(e)) 
and defendant does not allege they did not rely either 
by affidavit or pleading. We submit an affirmative 
defPnse of satisfaction or payment was improperly in" 
fprred without Lendit of evidence, affidavit or pleading 
to that effect. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
We submit the judgment should be reversed or a 
rehearing granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBER'l'S 
(\j BLACK_ 
SA~1TTEL BERNH'l'EI);T 
Counsel for Appe!Jant 
5:30 Judge f{uilding-
Salt Lake City, Ual1 
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